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ABSTRACT
When there is a lack of energy resources in the EU and it has to look for suppliers from other countries, Russia provides the world with most of the oil 
and gas. Diversification of energy resources is one of the objectives for the EU. The majority of international participants are interested in discovering 
the potential of the sea. However, the development of the region’s resources still faces many obstacles, such as lack of export pipelines, difficulties 
due to security of supply considerations, transit complications, political and legal considerations and market uncertainties. This study focuses on the 
countries of the former Soviet Union such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in Central Asia, and Azerbaijan in Transcaucasia. One of the 
six priority areas of the EU in the energy infrastructure of - the Southern Energy Corridor (SEC), the purpose of which is to link the Caspian basin 
and potentially Middle Eastern gas to Europe. In the article, we analyzed the potential of the Caspian basin in terms of energy and its impact on the 
energy security of the European Union.
Keywords: Caspian Sea, Central Asia, European Union, Southern Corridor, Pipeline, Energy Security 
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1. INTRODUCTION
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, three states 
were formed in Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. Their proved reserves of natural gas are 27.8 tcm 
(trillion cubic meters), which is 13.3% of the total volume in the 
world. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the 
region will become an important exporter of the gas and the total 
production will increase from 143 bcm (billion cubic meters) 
in 2009 to 265 bcm (billion cubic meters) in 2035 (Gas Trade 
Flows in Europe, 2010; Teleuyev et al., 2017). Table 1 presents 
the Central Asian states proven reserves, production, consumption 
and net exports in detail (British Petroleum, 2012). The Central 
Asia countries seek to maximize their rich natural gas reserves. 
Having inherited the Soviet pipeline network, they relied on 
Russia for most of their gas exports to the west (Table 1, for 
Central Asian exports by destination) (British Petroleum, 2012). 
Russian dominance in the field of gas transit and poor access 
to alternative markets have established value for Central Asian 
gas. Central Asian countries are trying to increase revenues from 
gas exports. Despite the fact that pipelines transporting Central 
Asian gas to distant markets should pass through several countries 
with strategic interests, Central Asian countries are looking for 
alternative pipeline projects that will diversify their transit routes 
as well as export markets. There are four major powers striving 
for potency in Central Asia: Europe and Turkey, led by the USA 
in the West, Russia in the North, rapidly growing China in the 
East and Iran seeking to become a regional power in the South. 
Russia’s reaction to the political events in Ukraine in 2014, and 
in particular its accession to the Crimea, military involvement in 
the separatist movements in eastern Ukraine and the catastrophe 
of the Malaysian airline MH17 caused a great comment on the 
European dependence on the Russian energy sector in general 
and, in particular, on the natural gas The price dispute, which led 
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to the cessation of Russia’s supply to Ukraine in June 2014 and 
the possibility of interruptions with gas supplies to Europe, has 
led to resumption of appeals for the diversification of European 
gas supplies and the reduction of Russian imports.
The Caspian is of central interest for European energy security, 
although the supply chain from the region has been traditionally 
kept under Russian Federation control. Today, the Caspian is also at 
the crossroads between the great and contradictory energy interests 
of the Russian Federation and Europe. In the last decade, the EU 
has become increasingly ambitious in planning the oil pipelines 
of the Caspian Sea, which exclude the territory of the Russian 
Federation, and the project of the Nabucco pipeline has been for 
many years at the heart of these strategic efforts.
The article argues that despite the serious tensions between the 
geopolitical realities of the region, the EU was able to become 
an important player in the field of energy security of the region, 
advancing its agenda, including the Nabucco geopolitical pipeline, 
the flag ship of the SEC. EU-supported SEC builds upon the oil 
and gas pipelines in order to prevent Russian monopoly over the 
Caspian Basin supplies. If the SEC is possible then it is mainly 
because of the path-dependent processes set off by the east-west 
corridor, which inextricably connected the international position 
of Azerbaijan and especially Georgia and Turkey transit role 
between the Caspian Sea and Europe. Iran is the largest country in 
the Middle East, capable of holding a serious international agenda. 
Consequently, an amicable relationship with Tehran, who could 
be convinced to act in the common interest of the region, would 
be highly beneficial for all parties involved (Crandall, 2006). 
Iran has gone from being a consumer of foreign technology and a 
pure exporter of oil to being an exporter of oil, gas and petroleum 
products, a manufacturer of petroleum sector equipment as well 
as a hub for energy connectivity in the region. The country has 
pipelines that are connected with Turkmenistan and Turkey. The 
EU’s demand of Caspian gas could be supplied through Iran. 
This paper has two major aims: First to determine potential and 
importance of the countries. Second, to examine the realistic 
options for reducing European dependence on Russian gas. Further, 
examines the alternative gas options for reducing dependence on 
Russian gas; it also provides some idea of the possible supplies 
through the pipelines and the likely competitiveness of Russian 
versus alternative gas supplies. The analysis will be based on 
a mixture of documentary analysis and a review of previous 
literature. The documents are published by relevant factors, 
such as the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and 
the International Energy Agency (IEA). These documents 
provide necessary statistical information. This statistical data, in 
combination with previous literature on the different countries’ 
energy policies will be instrumental to gain a full understanding 
of the Caspian region’s energy security dynamics.
In the field of energy security and the study of energy resources 
it is not customary to employ a theoretically focused approach. 
Instead, most academics have opted for a descriptive or historical 
methodology, wherein a full description of the case at hand 
informs the reader of a specific situation. Given the fact that 
energy security is becoming an ever more important aspect of 
international relations, it is worthwhile to consider integrating 
theories of international relations (IR) within the energy security 
field (Cenaks, 2010). The question then remains which theory 
would be best suited to analyze matters of energy security. This is 
quite a complex matter, given the rather vast amount of theoretical 
perspectives within international relations. It would require a 
thorough discussion of each of these theories in the energy security 
context to provide a solid answer to that question. For the purposes 
of this paper, such a discussion is not feasible. However, we can 
present some initial reflections on arguably the two most dominant 
IR theories: Realism and liberalism.
Realism is the oldest theory in international relations. Realists 
argue that the international system is defined by anarchy, and there 
is no central authority (Waltz, 1979).
Within that system states are sovereign and autonomous of each 
other. By consequence, realist scholars have little faith in the 
effectiveness of international institutions to contain the power of 
sovereign states. The realist vision on the world then rests upon 
four assumptions (Mearsheimer, 1994). Firstly, survival is the 
principle goal of every state. This means that states will always 
primarily make sure they can defend themselves from attacks, be 
they of militarily (primarily) or economical nature. Secondly, states 
are considered to be rational actors. They will always rationally 
consider the best way to maximize their survival potential. Thirdly, 
states all have some kind of military capacity and they do not 
know exactly how their neighbors would behave, thus making the 
world unpredictable and dangerous. Fourthly and lastly, the Great 
Powers, which are the states with the most military and economic 
might that dominate the international arena.
Liberalism (and its predecessor idealism) is the classical 
contender of realism in IR. Its core assumption is that national 
characteristics of states matter in international politics. This is 
completely different from realism, which assumes that all states 
have similar goals in the international arena. Instead liberalism 
claims that a state’s ideological focus has a strong influence on its 
Table 1: Natural gas in Central Asia and Caspian Basin
Country Production bcm Consumption bcm Net exports bcm Proven reserves
bcm (%)
Azerbaijan 14.8 8.2 6.6 1.3 (0.6)
Kazakhstan 19.3 9.2 10.1 1.9 (0.9)
Turkmenistan 59.5 25.0 24.5 24.3 (11.7)
Uzbekistan 57.0 49.1 7.9 1.6 (0.8)
Total 135.8 83.3 42.5 27.8 (13.4)
Source: British Petroleum, 2012. Statistical Review of World energy
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goals. Traditionally this argument has been used to differentiate 
between liberal states and others. The democratic peace theory, 
which claims that liberal states do not go to war with each other is 
a prime example of this differentiation (Doyle, 1997). Moravcsik 
has developed the liberal theory and claims it is based upon three 
assumptions (Moravcsik, 1997). Firstly, individuals and private 
groups, not states, are the most important actors in the international 
arena. Secondly, states represent a part of the domestic society, 
serving its interest. Thirdly, the combination of those preferences 
in the international system determines the behavior of states. The 
realist focus on balance of power and hegemony plays a secondary 
role at best. Furthermore, even though survival may still be an 
important goal, a state’s economic and ideological interests can 
be equally important. Regarding the matter which theory is best 
suited to analyze energy security issues, provide an interesting 
perspective, that will largely be adopted in this paper as well (Luft 
and Korin, 2009). They have attempted to integrate IR theory 
in matters of energy security and argue in favor of realism over 
liberalism. Political actors that belong to the liberal tradition (they 
mention former U.S. president Jimmy Carter as a prime example) 
claim that actors in the international arena are primarily interested 
in profit maximization in the energy market. However, realists 
argue that energy resources are not merely economic commodities, 
but are key elements in state power (Cesnakas, 2010). More energy 
resources equal more state power. That power is naturally affected 
both by the state’s ability to extract and transport the resources, 
and their global demand. As such, Luft and Korin claim that 
resources such as oil and gas cannot be treated as merely economic 
commodities, as long as those have key strategic value.
This paper is set clearly within the realist tradition. As such it 
will focus primarily on the action of states within the Caspian 
region and the power dynamics that come with energy security. 
Energy resources are material objects that have a clear political 
significance, which means that they belong very well in a 
materialistic ontology and a positivistic epistemology. The analysis 
that will follow is firmly based upon these assumptions.
1.1. Profile of the Caspian Basin, the Caspian Water 
Plateau
The Caspian is the world’s largest enclosed or landlocked body 
of (salty) water – approximately of the size of Germany and the 
Netherlands combined. Geographical literature refers to this water 
plateau as the sea, or world’s largest lake that covers an area of 
386,400 km. The Caspian coastline shared by five riparians (or 
littoral) states (Bajrektarevic, 2015). Table 3 is described about 
proved reserves of natural gas in the Caspian countries and it 
shows average of barrels increasing by each year. Central Asian 
countries and Azerbaijan proved oil reserves is increased from 
1994 till 2014 (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2015).
2. MATERIALS, METHODS AND
DISCUSSION
The “Inner Circle” of the Caspian Basin consists of the five littoral 
(riparian) states, Russian Federation, Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. They are could be 
roughly divided the traditional (Russian Federation and Iran), and 
the three newcomers (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan).
2.1. Russian Federation
The Russian Federation controls the north-western shore of the 
Caspian Sea and only a negligible part of its extensive energy 
reserves appear to be located in the Caspian Basin. Therefore, 
the Russian Federation has adopted a strategy of involvement in 
the energy business of the other, better-endowed riparian states 
by means of joint resource development (production revenues) 
and granting access to the Russian oil and gas pipeline system 
(transport revenues). The main players in this field are state-owned 
companies Gazprom, Rosneft, and Transneft as well as other large 
private energy enterprises like Lukoil, Sibneft or Yukos (Crandall, 
2006). From the 2000s the Russian Federation turned to bilateral 
and plurilateral agreements with Caspian littoral countries to 
secure its economic interests in the basin. Due to these efforts 
agreed upon the division of the Northern part of the Caspian with 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, while still strongly the five-party. 
Although this agreement presents a good sign for the future, its 
major downside is that it is completely dependent on the good 
relations between littoral states and therefore dependent on the 
current geopolitical realities of the Caspian. The top priority task 
in Russia’s fuel and energy expansion is to create an integrated 
water and fuel-energy complex in Central Asia (under Russian 
management). One of the possible ways to carry out this task 
is to include Tajikistan in the water-energy consortium being 
created. Russia’s goal is clear: It wants to strengthen its position 
as Turkmenistan’s main partner in the energy sector and, in so 
doing, maintain control over the export of Turkmen gas. Today, 
the growth rates of production, including those of gas export, 
from the Central Asian countries is much higher than the rates 
of modernizing and developing their gas transportation systems. 
But the main gas artery from the region’s states to Russia-the 
major gas Central Asia-Center pipeline – is currently operating 
to its limit. This relates to all three gas transportation countries: 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Regarding intra-
regional relations in general, Russia’s concerns about the influence 
of the EU and the US in the Caspian Basin have increased. As 
for Iran, the historically adverse relations have improved in some 
areas as the two powers still share a number of mutual interests in 
the Caspian Basin, for instance their joint opposition to growing 
Western interference in regional affairs.
2.2. Islamic Republic of Iran
Iran holds 16% of global proven gas reserves (Statistical Review 
of World Energy, 2009). Total gas production in 2014 was 172.6 
bcm, while domestic consumption stood at 117.6 bcm. More than a 
third of domestic consumption is used for boosting oil production 
by pumping gas into maturing oil fields. In 2009, natural gas had 
a share of 57.9% of total energy supplies; oil was down at 40.8%. 
Foreign investment is all blocked due to US bilateral sanctions 
based on the Iran sanctions Act (1996), sanctions imposed by 
the UN and the EU (Table 1) (Mangott, 2010). It is in Russia’s 
vital interest that Iran does not turn into a competitor on the EU 
gas markets. Iran is considered an attractive export route for oil 
and gas between Central Asia and Europe, and for oil from both 
Central Asia and Transcaucasia to the Persian Gulf. It already has 
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a well-developed oil and gas infrastructure, including portions 
of pipeline that could be used for the routes mentioned above 
or for swaps. By some estimates, an Iranian route could prove 
significantly cheaper than other proposed pipelines. Foreign policy 
priorities have been affected by its past dominance as well as the 
religious ties with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Of 
the most concern are the Islamic Republic of Iran´ s relations with 
Azerbaijan, hampered due to Azerbaijan´s westward cooperation 
on energy matters (Dekmejian and Simonian, 2003).
Additionally, the ethnic Azeri minority makes up a quarter of Iran´s 
population. An economically strong and independent Azerbaijan, 
could potentially incite the Azeri population in Iran to start its 
own nationalistic movement and threaten its territorial integrity. 
Azerbaijan to rise any further as a global oil player might as well 
be seen as Iran’s strategic goal (Croissant and Aras, 1999).
There are serious doubts about the viability of the proposed 
Armenia–Georgia–Ukraine pipeline on economic and – following 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea – geographical grounds. Aside from 
these options, gas exports to Europe via Turkey using existing 
infrastructure, seems the most feasible option prior to 2020.
Irrespective of the technical and geopolitical feasibility of these 
proposed routes, the second major uncertainty over the export 
of Iranian gas to Europe is the availability of sufficient gas for 
export markets over and above Iran’s domestic requirements. 
With the required investment and technology, Iran could increase 
production capacity to around 210–230 bcm/year by 2018, but this 
is expected to be mainly allocated to domestic and regional export 
markets. After meeting growing domestic demand – expected 
to reach 200–220 bcm/year before 2020 – and supplying gas 
to the already contracted export markets of the neighboring 
countries of Turkey (10 bcm/year), Iraq (10 bcm/year), and Oman 
(5–10 bcm/year), any gas available for export to the rest of Europe 
is expected to remain marginal prior to 2020.
Beyond 2020, depending on how fast Iran can develop the remaining 
phases of the South Pars and other major discovered gas fields, the 
country’s total production capacity could reach around 350 bcm/year 
by 2030 (Hassanzadeh, 2014). It is only then that significant exports 
to Europe can be envisaged, provided that the required infrastructure 
can be made available. Exports of around 10–20 bcm/year to Europe 
through Turkey via the existing infrastructure are possible in the 
2020s, but it is unrealistic to imagine more substantial volumes 
becoming a reality until after 2030 (Hassanzadeh, 2014).
2.3. Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan’s total energy production has increased almost three-
fold from 27.9 million to 74.9 million oil equivalent mainly due to 
oil and gas production. The country’s total energy consumption in 
2009 was about 15.7 million tons, which means that a significant 
part of its production is exported.
Controlling the western side of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan holds 
a crucial position between Central Asia and Europe. Azerbaijan 
produced 41.7 million tons of oil in 2007. Heavily dependent 
on the oil sector, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic 
(SOCAR) was created to efficiently benefit from the abundance 
of hydrocarbon resources in the respective sector of the Caspian 
Sea (Aras et al., 2013).
The Shah Deniz Phase 2 project is expected to go into production 
in late 2018, and to start exporting to Europe in late 2019. In 
addition to Shah Deniz, there are several offshore Caspian fields 
and exploration prospects that could increase Azerbaijan’s gas 
production in the 2020s. One field, Absheron, has been declared 
commercial under a PSA (with Total as operator, GDF Suez, and 
SOCAR); production is expected to start in 2021. SOCAR officials 
have projected an increase in production to 40–45 bcm of sales gas 
by 2025; this assumes 9–14 bcm/year of gas from new offshore 
projects. (Scalability as Drawn’, Azerbaijan, 2012) We estimate 
that 3–8 bcm/year of additional gas could become available for 
export to Europe at some point in the 2020s.
2.4. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
Holding the greatest share of Caspian oil in its national sector, 
Kazakhstan´s foreign policy is influenced by its dependence on 
Table 3: Oil – total proved reserves
Country At end 1994 
Thousand million 
barrels
At end 2004 
Thousand million 
barrels
At end 2013 
Thousand 
million barrels










Azerbaijan 1.2 7.0 7.0 1.0 7.0 0.4 22.6
Kazakhstan 5.3 9.0 30.0 3.9 30.0 1.8 48.3
Turkmenistan 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.6 6.9
Uzbekistan 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.6 24.3
Central Asia total 7.3 17.2 42.6 5.1 38.2 2.2 102.1
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 
Table 2: Natural gas exports from Central Asia and Caspian Basin
Exports to Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
Russia 1.4 11.5 10.1 2.2
Iran 0.4 - 10.2 -
China - - 14.3 -
Turkey 3.8 - - -
Others 1.7 0.1 - 2.0
Source: British Petroleum, 2012. Statistical Review of World energy
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Russian Federation as a primary energy transit route. Additionally, 
the growing inflow of FDI from China signals the rising importance 
of cooperation with the east.
Uzbekistan is a major gas producer (50–60 bcm/year in recent 
years), and Kazakhstan an expanding one (about 12 bcm/year in 
recent years, likely to rise to 20–25 bcm/year in the 2020s). Most 
Uzbek and Kazakh gas is consumed domestically; small quantities 
(7–10 bcm/year from each) are exported to Russia; and both countries 
have concluded framework agreements, and some contracts, with 
China, providing for exports via the Turkmenistan–China pipeline, 
which started in 2013 from Uzbekistan. It is possible that Uzbek 
and Kazakh exports to Russia will fall in the 2020s, but there will 
be calls on this gas from China and from their domestic markets.
There are essentially just two viable ways that Uzbek and Kazakh 
gas could reach the European market. Namely, Kazakh gas could 
be transported by pipeline across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, 
and thence to Europe.
Via Russia, via existing pipelines, to European destinations. (Such 
sales were conducted, with the gas bought and resold by Gazprom 
and other Russian companies, from the mid-1990s to 2009 (OIES 
Paper, 2014).
2.5. Turkmenistan
The European Southern Corridor strategy, Turkmen gas could 
come from Trans-Caspian pipeline, envisioned to transfer 
Turkmeni gas to Azerbaijan via the Caspian Sea, where it could 
easily connect to the pipelines heading for Europe. These plans also 
effectively bypass both Russian Federation and Islamic Republic 
of Iran, but their major are the bad relations between Turkmenistan 
and Azerbaijan over the demarcation of the Caspian basin.
For Iran, a closer relationship with Turkmenistan promised useful 
oil swap agreements and access to the potentially lucrative Turkish 
natural gas market. The related further step of reaching Europe 
through Turkey would have put both Iran and Turkmenistan on 
the map as competitors to Gazprom. Iran considered, therefore, 
the 6 BCM Korpedzhe (on the Caspian shore of Turkmenistan) to 
Kurt-Kui line as a useful first step. The line was funded by Iran, 
with Turkmen debt to be repaid through gas deliveries. Still, the 
line had immediate advantages for Iran. A new domestic line 
linking gas fields in the south to the populous and industrial north-
west would have cost far more than the Korpedzhe to Kurt-Kui 
pipeline (Kandiyoti, 2008). Since then Beijing has emerged as 
Turkmenistan’s near monopolistic buyer-about 80% of Turkmen 
gas exports are now directed toward China. If the Turkmen 
authorities want to avoid total dependency on China, they will 
have to reopen discussion with Europe, but such a push does 
not appear likely to come either from Ashgabat or from Brussels 
in short term (Maruelle and Mankoff, 2016). I assume that the 
only likely Central Asian source for significant gas exports to 
Europe is Turkmenistan. With only Turkmenistan contributing 
significantly to any gas transport towards the EU, additional gas 
from Azerbaijan will most likely have to ensure the necessary 
capacity utilization and economies of scale in order to make the 
EU’s tapping of Caspian resources economically viable (Table 4).
In 2011, the EU-27 imported about 83% of its crude oil, 64% 
of natural gas and 47% of its coal demand (Directorate General 
for Energy, 2013). Fossil fuel projections towards 2030 indicate 
that gas demand is most likely to rise while oil consumption will 
stagnate at the current high level (Europe’s Energy Position. Past 
and present, 2008). So far, Russia is the EU’s most important 
energy supplier. Russia’s share of EU gas oil, and coal imports 
amount 34%, 33% and 26, 2% respectively. Norway and Libya, 
the EU’s second and third largest supplier of oil, account for about 
15 and 10%of imports. In the field of gas, Norway and Algeria 
contribute 31 and 14% to the EU’s demand (Gstol and Lannon, 
2015). Though EU energy imports are likely to further diversify 
as a consequence of increasing liquefied natural gas imports 
from Africa and Middle East, additional political steps towards 
diversification are necessary.
In the analysis on energy Import Dependency, which is made by 
European commission, we can see and make comparison, how it 
is increased from 1995 until 2014, it means that European Union 
seeks the way to diversify its energy demand (Table 5).
An important conclusion from Table 6 is that for the three 
groups of countries which are highly dependent on Russian gas, 
demand is expected to increase by less than 7 bcm during the 
period 2013–2030: In Central Europe by 5.2 bcm, in the Baltic 
countries by 1.05 bcm, and in south-east Europe by 0.4 bcm. 
In 2030, total demand for gas in countries highly dependent on 
Russian gas in the Baltics and south-east Europe will be 19.3 
bcm. In Central Europe, demand is much larger, particularly 
in Poland (which has significant domestic gas production and 
an SCI which is significantly lower than other countries in the 
region).
2.5.1. Alternative sources of gas supply to Europe
In the early 1970s, European indigenous production covered most 
of the region’s gas demand. By 2013, due to faster growth rates 
of consumption and a decline in gas production since the early 
2000s, it only accounted for around 57% of demand (Data for 
OECD Europe in IEA Natural Gas, 2014). European production 
is falling everywhere apart from Norway, and as a result, despite 
slow demand growth expected up to 2030, Europe will become 
sharply dependent on imports. Two countries represented 70% 
of the indigenous production in 2013 – Norway: 109 bcm and 
the Netherlands: 86 bcm. These countries are also the two main 
sources of indigenous gas for the other European countries. 
Production from the UK continental shelf (UKCS) is still crucial, 
at about 38 bcm, but it only represents about half of the national 
needs. Another 19 countries produced gas in 2013; this was used 
by their national markets, except for Denmark which exported 
small quantities. Table 6, shows scenarios for indigenous gas 
production in Europe for 2015, 2020, and 2030. Production is 
expected to decline from 282 bcm in 2013 to about 266 bcm 
in 2015, mostly due to the limit imposed on production from 
the Groningen field in the Netherlands. By 2020, indigenous 
production could decline by another 20 bcm as a result of sharper 
decline in the Netherlands, UK, and Germany. By 2030, European 
conventional gas production is expected to be about 172 bcm, a 
reduction of 110 bcm compared with 2013 (Reducing European 
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Dependence on Russian Gas: Distinguishing natural gas security 
from geopolitics, 2014).
Table 7 shows, that the total is deeply dependent on the three largest 
producers, which account for 82–84% of the total throughout 
the period (Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas: 
Distinguishing natural gas security from geopolitics, 2014).
2.5.2. The EU’s South European gas corridor: Options for gas 
supplies
The EU has been an active outside its borders in attempting to 
diversify its import supply routes and strengthen its ties with non-
Russian suppliers in its neighborhood. This had led to a nascent 
“energy diplomacy.” Already in 2008 the EU had announced a 
strategy to open up new gas import routes from Central Asia, the 
Caucasus and the Middle East – a project known as the Southern 
Corridor (Dreyer and Stang, 2014). In June 2013, the Shah Deniz 
consortium and its leading stakeholders (the State Oil Company 
of Azerbaijan [SOCAR], BP, Statoil, Total, Lukoil, NICO and 
TPAO, Turkey’s national energy company) concluded negotiations 
that have lasted over a decade, approving the Trans-Adriatic 
Pipeline (TAP) for the final leg of a pipeline bringing gas from 
the Shah Deniz field in the Caspian Sea to European markets. The 
consortium made a Final Investment Decision (FID) for stage 2 
development of the Shah Deniz field, triggering plans to expand 
the South Caucasus Pipeline through Azerbaijan and Georgia, 
construct the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) across 
Turkey and construct the TAP across Greece and Albania and into 
Italy. The first gas delivery to Europe (10 bcm/y) is scheduled for 
2019 while plans to double this capacity are on the books. Another 
6 bcm/y will go to Turkey (Atlantic Council, 2012).
In order to diversify EU gas supply, and to provide Caspian 
suppliers with new export routes, several projects have been 
studied, re-evaluated, scrapped and resurfaced for the Southern 
Gas Corridor. The European Commission’s declared objective 
remains to eventually supply 10% of European gas demand via an 
enhanced Southern Gas Corridor, but the current scenario would 
see the Corridor initially supply about 2% or 3% of Europe’s 
demand. This may seem minor, but the countries receiving the 
gas – from Bulgaria to Greece – are those that have the biggest 
energy security concerns due to reliance on Russian gas (European 
Commission, 2013). With British petrol committing its Shah Deniz 
resources to the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor 10 billion cubic 
meters of Azerbaijani gas will eventually find its way to Europe 
by 2018 (Turkmen Gas: Through Caspian Sea to Europe, 2012).
The source diversification provided by the Southern Gas Corridor 
is not a panacea for European energy security but represents an 
important step in expanding Europe’s energy frontiers towards 
the Caucasus and potential future partners in Iraq, Turkmenistan 
or Azerbaijan.
The Caspian and the Central Asian countries have a number of 
options to diversify their transport routes as well as export markets. 
While there is only the Turkmenistan–China pipeline to reach 
eastwards, three routes extend from Central Asia to the West: Via 
the Caspian Sea, via Iran, and via Russia.
Nabucco-West vs. TAP. After years of fierce competition among 
Europe’s energy giants, the developers of a major Azerbaijani 
natural gas field in the Caspian Sea recently picked the Trans-
Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) project over the Nabucco West project to 
Table 4: Natural gas – total proved reserves
Country At end 1994 
Thousand million 
barrels
At end 2004 
Thousand million 
barrels
At end 2013 
Thousand 
million barrels










Azerbaijan n/a 0.9 0.9 41.2 1.2 0.6 68.8
Kazakhstan n/a 1.3 1.5 53.2 1.5 0.8 78.2
Turkmenistan n/a 2.3 17.5 617.3 17.5 9.3
Uzbekistan n/a 1.2 1.1 38.3 1.1 0.6 19.0
Central Asia total 5.7 21 750 21.3 11.3 166
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 
Table 5: Import dependency – all fuels, %
Import from 
extra EU 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2013 2014
EU -28 43.1 46.7 52.2 52.6 53.1 53.5
Index 1995 100.0 108.3 121.1 122.2 123.3 124.1
Intra and Extra-EU imports
BE 80.8 78.1 80.1 77.9 77.4 80.1
BG 55.9 46.0 46.7 39.6 37.7 34.5
CZ 20.6 22.9 28.0 25.6 27.9 30.4
DK 33.4 -35.0 -49.8 -15.7 13.3 12.8
DE 56.8 59.4 60.4 60.1 62.66 61.6
EE 32.3 32.2 26.1 13.6 11.9 8.9
IE 69.5 84.8 89.6 86.6 89.3 85.3
EL 66.7 69.5 68.6 69.2 62.2 66.2
ES 71.7 76.6 81.4 76.7 70.4 72.9
FR 48.0 51.5 51.6 49.1 48.0 46.1
HR 36.1 48.4 52.5 46.6 47.0 43.8
IT 81.9 86.5 83.4 82.6 76.8 75.9
CY 100.5 98.6 100.7 100.8 96.4 93.4
LV 70.4 61.0 63.9 45.5 55.8 40.6
LT 63.1 59.4 56.8 81.8 78.3 77.9
LU 97.7 99.6 97.4 97.1 97.0 96.6
HU 47.9 55.2 63.1 58.2 52.1 61.7
MT 104.8 100.3 100.1 99.0 104.1 97.7
NL 20.0 38.1 38.0 30.3 26.1 33.8
AT 66.4 65.4 71.6 62.8 61.6 65.9
PL -1.2 9.9 17.2 31.3 25.6 28.6
PT 85.3 85.1 88.6 75.1 72.9 71.6
RO 30.3 21.8 27.6 21.9 18.5 17.0
SI 50.9 52.8 52.5 48.6 46.9 44.6
SK 68.5 65.6 65.3 63.1 59.2 60.9
FI 53.6 55.1 54.2 47.8 48.5 48.8
SE 38.9 40.7 36.8 36.6 31.6 32.1
UK -16.4 -16.9 13.4 28.4 46.4 45.5
Source: EU Commission. EU energy in figures, statistical pocketbook 2016
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transport Caspian natural gas to Europe. According to the estimated 
cost of the project is around $5 billion (TAP Clinches Azeri Gas 
Pipeline Deal, 2013). If constructed, TAP, developed by Norway’s 
Statoil, Switzerland’s EGL and Germany’s E. ON, will ship 10 
bcm of gas per year, with the option to increase the capacity up 
to 20 bcm. It will run through Greece and Albania, under the 
Adriatic Sea to southern Italy. The construction of TAP would 
provide the countries involved in this project, such as Greece and 
Albania, with a large inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and foster economic growth. West is the shortened form of the 
“Nabucco” put forward a few years ago. “Nabucco”, one branch 
of which started from Georgian-Turkish border and was more 
than 3 thousand km in length, was planned for the transportation 
of 31 billion m3 of gas from Central Asia, South Caucuses and 
Middle East regions. The geopolitical situation in the above-
mentioned regions, and the absence of export routes from these 
regions Europe put the realization of that project under question 
(Nabucco West or TAP,2016). Considering the gains accruing 
to Azerbaijan and Continental Europe from TAP and Nabucco-
West would favor TAP over Nabucco-West in 2013. TAP is based 
on a 2013 intergovernmental agreement between Albania, Italy 
and Greece. The advantage of the TAP project is that it links the 
Caspian Sea and Turkey on one side and the European market on 
the other. Apart from its main route to Italy, which is the biggest 
European gas market after Germany, interconnectors can be built 
to Bulgaria from Greece, as well as a new pipeline to Montenegro 
and Croatia along the Adriatic coast from the tie-in in Albania, the 
Ionian Adriatic Pipeline (IAP).
Via the Caspian Sea (TCP). TCP carries Central Asian gas via an 
offshore pipeline under the Caspian Sea to its western coast, and 
from there the Southern Corridor (TANAP and TAP) delivers the 
gas to the Turkish and European markets. Turkmenistan benefits 
by 0.5 bn € since TCP bypasses the current transit countries, 
i.e., Russia and Iran, and introduces a new transport route for
westbound Central Asian gas. Turkmenistan’s spare production 
capacity is enough to fill up the offshore pipeline’s capacity. Turkey 
enjoys supply competition in its market as well as it strains it 
position on the route (0.bn €). However, Azerbaijan benefits from 
Turkmenistan’s access to its export markets (0.5bn €) since it is the 
transit country on the route and controls Turkmenistan’s access to 
the Southern Corridor. Although the EC supports TCP, Turkmen 
gas via TCP returns the European players (the Balkans, Continental 
Europe and UK) only 0.3bn €due to the transit countries on the 
route, and the European companies show little interest in the 
project. Costing 0.5bn€ (Cobanli, 2014), is strategically viable 
for the non-European countries Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and 
Turkey (1.5bn € in total). However, continuing opposition from 
Russia and Iran currently appears likely to prevent any submarine 
gas pipeline across the Caspian from moving beyond a hypothesis 
(Staadmuller and Bachmaan, 2012).
Via Iran (TTP) Linking Turkmenistan via Iran to the Southern 
Corridor. Turkmenistan benefits 0.3bn €. Again, the transit 
countries, in this case Turkey and Iran, collect most of the gains 
from the project. While Turkey enjoys supply competition in 
its market, Iran benefits from better access to the markets. TTP 
affects the rest of the players in an analogous manner to TCP. In 
the nearest time, Turkmenistan intends to initiate gas extraction 
in the world’s second gas field Galkynysh, whose reserves are 
Table 7: Indigenous conventional gas production in 
European markets 2013–2030 (bcm)
Country 2013 2015 2020 2030 
Norway 109 109 110 100 
UK 38 38 34 20 
Netherlands 86 71 63 26 
Other 49 48 39 27 
TOTAL 282 266 246 172 
Norway/UK/Netherlands as a 
% of total 
83 82 84 84 
Table 6: Gas demand scenarios for those countries which are – and are likely to continue to be – highly dependent on 
Russian gas (with an SCI exceeding 30) up to 2030 (Honoré, 2014)
Country Gas demand in 2013 Russian gas imports in 2013 Gas demand projections
Central European countries 2015 2020 2025 2030
Austria 8.53 4.79 8.53 7.54 7.60 7.11
Czech Republic 8.47 7.27 8.08 8.69 8.68 9.94
Slovakia 5.81 5.06 4.72 4.86 6.19 7.66
Poland 18.31 11.87 15.73 17.08 19.49 21.07
Hungary 9.28 5.52 10.65 11.12 10.37 9.79
Total 50.4 34.51 47.70 49.30 52.33 55.57
Baltic countries
Estonia 0.68 0.64 0.34 0.38 0.41 0.43
Latvia 1.73 1.01 1.83 1.93 2.05 2.13
Lithuania 2.71 2.21 3.24 3.47 3.75 4.03
Finland 3.48 3.22 2.33 2.35 2.72 3.06
Total 8.6 7.08 7.74 8.13 8.92 9.65
South east European countries
FYROM 0.16 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Bosnia/Herzegovina 0.19 0.18 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.30
Bulgaria 2.59 2.67 2.89 3.03 3.14 3.29
Serbia 2.52 1.84 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.30
Greece 3.84 2.39 4.32 4.10 3.85 3.64
Total 9.3 7.17 9.89 9.82 9.69 9.65
Grand Total 68.3 48.76 65.33 67.25 70.95 74.86
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evaluated from 13.1 to 21.2 tcm of natural gas. In view of starting 
the development of such giant gas field, Ashkhabad is concerned 
about seeking new exports routes (Zhiltsov et al., 2016). Iran has 
the world’s biggest proven gas reserves, and Turkmenistan is 
ranked number four globally in terms of gas reserves. Together, the 
two neighboring countries, located in the richest swathe of land in 
the world in terms of energy resources, between the Caspian Sea 
and the Persian Gulf, have some 25% of the world’s gas. With the 
European Union and the United States lifting sanctions against 
Iran on 16th January 2016, the EU will gain access to a second 
major gas market in the world, beside Russia, and combined with 
the soaring LNG imports envisaged in the next few years, the 
EU’s Energy Union’s strategic goal to diversify Europevs energy 
supply could be reached. After raising sanctions and normalizing 
the Tehran-US relationships and the extension of the new gas 
pipeline presently, supplying gas only to Iran as far as Turkey and 
further on to Europe could become soon reality.
Via Russia: From South Stream to Turkish Stream. The south 
stream project is Russia’s response to Nabucco. It was first 
launched in June 2007 when the Italian energy company Eni 
and Gazprom of Russia signed a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) which push the construction of 900 km submarine 
pipeline from Druzhba on the Russian Black sea coast to the 
Bulgarian city of Varna. In Bulgaria, the pipeline will divide into 
two. The southern side will run through Greece and under the 
Ionic sea to Italy, while the northwestern part will run through 
Serbia and Hungary to the Baumgarten gas hub in Austria. On 
December 1, 2014, following a meeting between the Russian and 
Turkish presidents, president Putin and Gazprom CEO A. Miller 
announced that South Stream had been cancelled. The South 
Stream cancellation was accompanied by a Russian announcement 
that it would be replaced with pipelines of the same capacity to 
deliver gas across the Black Sea directly to Turkey. Of the 63 
bcm/year of capacity, 14 bcm/year would replace the volume 
currently delivered to Turkey via Ukraine and the trans-Balkan 
pipeline, while the part (approximately 50 bcm/year) would be 
delivered to the Turkish-Greek border where Gazprom would set 
up a natural gas “hub” for Southern European customers (Stern 
et al., 2015). Turkish Stream proposals – both of which would 
create a new route in bringing (the same) Russian gas to Europe. 
For the EU, the energy security benefits of South Stream and 
Turkish Stream involving avoiding gas transit through Ukraine. 
Both routes diversify supply routes, although not supply sources 
(In the European Parliament Resolution, 2012).
Russians officials have stated that if the negotiations progress, gas 
could be delivered by the end of 2016. Turkish authorities, on the 
other hand, expect the project to continue for at least two and half 
years (De Micco, 2015).
3. CONCLUSIONS
The five Caspian littoral states differ in terms of size, power 
projection capabilities and wealth in on- and offshore natural 
resources. The two main Caspian littoral powers are Russia and 
Iran, both endowed with huge natural gas and oil resources on 
shore, and both not very well endowed with natural gas resources 
offshore in the Caspian Sea. The other three Caspian littoral states 
lack power projection capabilities, lack a diverse export market 
for natural resources (especially Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan). 
As such, the vision of importing large quantities of natural gas 
or oil from the eastern side of the Caspian (Central Asia) to the 
Western side of the Caspian (Europe), is a task and will require 
a shift in EU foreign policy or alliances vis a vis third countries. 
The EU’s energy security policy revolved around primarily two 
objectives: Integration and diversification. The former of these 
meant expanding the internal EU market structures, this way also 
including external actors. This focus on transparent market rules 
and networks would strengthen Brussels, as it would increase 
access and availability of energy resources to the EU. Moreover, 
by interlinking energy infrastructure the Union would become 
more resilient to possible supply disruptions. In terms of the EU’s 
diversification efforts, these were mainly related to attempts to 
establish new routes, seek to include new energy suppliers and 
finally to promote different energy types. All these three factors can 
be seen as having the same fundament in the EU energy thinking; 
as too large dependence on any one of these would constitute an 
energy security risk. Caspian basin and Central Asian countries 
played a role in both of the EU concerns. The EU-Caspian energy 
structure could become a counterweight to Russia.
As things stand now, the geographical limits dictate three possible 
or already realized options of shipping Eastern Caspian energy 
resources to the Western Caspian. The first one is a legacy of the 
Soviet Union: Central Asian and Caspian energy resources being 
shipped through Russian territory and pipelines, to Europe. This 
is the status quo. The second option is to build trans-Caspian 
pipelines, pipelines for the transport of gas and oil, from the 
Eastern sea beds of the Caspian, to the Western sea beds of the 
Caspian, to ship the onwards to Europe. Thirdly, the “southern 
route,” piping Eastern Caspian natural gas and oil through over 
land pipelines, via Iran, to Turkey and onwards to Europe. All three 
options have pitfalls, drawbacks and rewards. In this conclusion, 
I will focus on the ’path of least resistance’.
As mentioned above the EU policy push towards supply 
diversification is to lessen the dependence and power of Russia. 
Chiefly because of that reason, the first option (piping more 
Caspian and Central Asian energy to Europe through Russia) is 
not plausible and not a viable option. The second option, building 
under sea pipelines, cutting through the Caspian Sea, from East 
to West, has great challenges of a different nature. The biggest 
problem with this option is the tandem opposition of Russia and 
Iran. Would be deprived of a very large potential future market, 
the EU. Russia would not only be deprived of a “potential future 
market,” but it would also undermine current gas delivery volumes.
The third and final option is the southern route, piping the energy 
overland, from the Eastern Caspian, through Iran, to Turkey and 
onwards to the EU. This is the path of least resistance.
There are already pipelines between Turkmenistan and Iran and 
between Iran and Turkey. Although those pipelines don’t have 
nearly enough capacity, parallel lines can be built. Routing through 
Iran solves two crucial problems. Firstly, it lessens dependence on 
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Russian energy supplies. As such, it gives the captive Turkmen 
and Kazakh export markets a big breather. Their oil and gas can 
even be sold through the Persian Gulf ports. Secondly, it solves 
the insurmountable problem of double/tandem Russian-Iranian 
opposition to Caspian Sea pipelines. The EU has enough power 
to deal with Iran (mostly economically), but less with Russia. 
Iran has a population of 80 million and cultural, historical links 
to the other Caspian littoral nations. Also, it gives those small 
countries a viable alternative vis a vis Russia, in order to balance 
their foreign relations. As such, this EU policy, if executed well, 
could two birds with one stone: Not only lessen dependence on 
Russian gas/oil (transit), but also to lessen Russia’s influence in 
the littoral nations. That will force Russia to negotiate better prices 
in the future. As a side-bonus: Iran would be invested in behaving 
itself in the region and even in the middle east. Because being a 
reliable transit country for the first few years, would make EU 
policy heads open toward purchasing large quantities of Iranian 
gas, running along parallel lines, in the future. If executed well, 
this solution will catch three birds with one stone for the EU.
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